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Abstract
This paper studies the potential effects of political pressure on environmental law 
enforcement in the Unites States. Prior work, most notably the key works of Deily and 
Gray,  document  the  sensitivity  of  U.S.  environmental  enforcement  to  economic 
circumstances of regulated firms. However, the sensitivity of environmental enforcement 
may be motivated not only by cost-benefit criterion (economic costs of environmental 
enforcement against troubled firms in high unemployment areas are high) but also by 
political considerations, and most likely both. We are interested in identifying whether 
political influence directly affected environmental enforcement during the years 1990-
2005, which cover most part of the Bush and Clinton administrations. Using political, 
demographic  and  income  related  data  from  various  sources  and  mapping  them  with 
EPA’s data on facility level inspection, we find evidence that political processes at the 
local, state and federal level do matter for facility level inspection.     2
1. Introduction
Political pressure on decision making institutions that are autonomous and non-
political in nature is a common phenomenon across the globe. Organizations like the 
Transparency  International  and  International  Country  Risk  Guide  routinely  document 
such pressure in terms of their measure of political risk, democratic accountability of 
institutions etc. Usually, the incidents of political pressure on autonomous institutions are 
more prevalent in developing countries; however, developed countries like the United 
States is perhaps no exception. This paper tries to examine the potential effects of such 
political pressure on environmental law enforcement in the Unites States. Previously, 
researchers  like  Gray  and  Deily  (1996)  have  shown  that  greater  environmental 
compliance leads to less enforcement by the EPA indicating that enforcement is sensitive 
to  the  level  of  compliance.  Another  key  work  by  Deily  and  Gray  (1991)  have 
documented the sensitivity of U.S. environmental enforcement to economic circumstance 
of  regulated  firms.  For  example,  if  a  plant  is  located  in  an  area  with  substantial 
unemployment and is in financial trouble, it is less likely to be subject to inspection and 
enforcement under Federal environmental laws. It is conceivable that economic costs of 
environmental enforcement against troubled firms in high unemployment areas are high 
and  this  might  make  institution  like  the  EPA  sensitive  to  the  prevailing  economic 
situation  of  an  environmentally  lax  area.  However,  the  sensitivity  of  environmental 
enforcement may be motivated not only by economic cost-benefit criterion but also by 
political  considerations,  and  most  likely  both.  In  this  paper,  we  are  interested  in 
identifying  whether  political  influence  directly  affects  environmental  enforcement.  In 
particular,  if  a  plant’s  congressional  representatives  are  particularly  powerful  (ceteris 3
paribus), can the plant expect less enforcement scrutiny? Does the direction of any such 
effect  depend  upon  the  political  persuasion  of  the  congressional  representatives?  For 
example,  if  the  representatives  are  Democratic  in  a  district  with  a  large 
“environmentalist” constituency, does political power translate into more enforcement, 
rather  than  less?  Conversely,  if  the  representatives  are  Republican,  does  influence 
translate into less enforcement? And how do different types of political power affect 
matters?  For example, does power in the Congressional hierarchy translate into effect on 
enforcement?  Does  commonality  of  party  affiliation  between  the  Congressional 
representatives and the Administration in the White House (both Democrat/Republican) 
translate into enforcement effects? 
These questions are important if one wants to understand the nature and effects of 
environmental  law  enforcement.  If  political  influence  is  an  important  driver  of 
enforcement activities, then models of environmental enforcement need to account for the 
political  economy  in  order  to  judge  environmental  and  economic  impacts.  To  our 
knowledge,  neither  extant  empirical  nor  theoretical  work  on  environmental  law 
enforcement has studied the role of politics, although there is substantial theoretical work 
on the political economy of environmental regulation (setting of tax rates, for example).  
The  remaining  sections  of  the  paper  are  organized  in  the  following  manner. 
Section 2 discusses the main idea and the hypotheses. Section 3 describes the data and the 
empirical model. Finally, section 4 concludes with a brief discussion of the results. 4
2. Main Idea and the Hypotheses
The US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) is an autonomous regulatory 
body to oversee the enforcement of environmental policy. However, like in the common 
agency  models,  several  organizations,  parties,  elected  individuals  and  even  common 
public can try to exert their influence on EPA to achieve outcome in their respective 
preferred  direction.  One  of  the  most  discussed  common  agency  problems  is  the 
intervention of political processes in the economic, enforcement and public policy related 
activities of an autonomous institution. Dixit et. al (1997) talked about legislators’ actions 
under  pressure  from  contributors,  voters,  party  officials,  lobby  groups  etc.  It  is  not 
unusual that such pressure from these groups can be relegated to institutions like the 
EPA, which ultimately can shape its policies accordingly. Thus, if political parties like 
the Democratic and the Republican Party differ (because of several contested reasons) in 
their  approach  towards  environment,  then  such  differentiated  approach  might  get 
reflected  in  EPA’s  inspection  and/or  enforcement  activities  in  regions  where  these 
respective parties are in power. Though none of these parties openly claims that it prefers 
environment over economy or economy over environment in cases where there exists a 
clear tradeoff between environment and economy, yet it is conceivable that these two 
parties’ views towards this tradeoff might differ. The idea gains ground if we think of 
numerous domestic and international issues where these two political parties differ in 
their views; these issues include tax cuts, homeland security, immigration, health care, 
war in the Middle East, outsourcing etc. 
It is therefore, important to test if EPA’s inspection/enforcement activities at the 
facility level differ across areas depending upon the historical/current political scenario in 5
such areas. For example, EPA’s monitoring activities might significantly differ between
two areas located in two different states where one of the areas is traditionally democratic 
and is represented by a democratic congressman who works in tandem with democratic 
senators and the other area is traditionally republican and is represented by a republican 
congressman and republican senators at the state level. In addition to this, it can also be 
suspected that the influence of the representatives and the senators exerted to EPA would 
be more as they spend more time in power. In other words, political seniority might make 
them more influential in EPA’s monitoring activities. Other than from the political angle, 
it  is  also  important  to  investigate  if  EPA’s  monitoring  activities  at  the  facility  level
depend on the local economic situations as documented in Deily & Gray (1991). State 
level  environmental  awareness  and  strict  liability  statute  might  also  matter  in  EPA’s 
decision making. In order to gain insights in the above issues, we formally propose the 
following  hypotheses.  The  hypotheses  cover  political,  economic  and  environmental 
aspects of EPA’s decision making.
Hypothesis I: EPA’s inspection activity at the facility level will be significantly different 
depending upon which political party is in power at the local and the state level.
Hypothesis II: EPA’s inspection activity at the facility level will be significantly different 
depending upon the political seniority of the representative and the senators even after 
controlling for their party affiliation.
Hypothesis  III: EPA’s  inspection  activity  at  the  facility  level  will  be  significantly 
different  depending  on  (i)  whether  the  state  has  a  strict  liability  statute  and  (ii) 
environmental awareness (Sierra club membership) at the state level.6
Hypothesis IV: EPA’s inspection activity at the facility level will be significantly lower 
in areas where unemployment pressure is high.  
To test the above hypotheses, we use data from several sources, which is discussed in the 
next section.   
                  
3. Data & the Empirical Model
This study uses an unbalanced panel dataset which is constructed from several 
data sources. We use facility-level EPA dataset on the enforcement of U.S. clean air laws 
for the  years 1990-2005. This  includes the administrations of George Bush  (years in 
service: 1989-1992), Bill Clinton (years in service: 1993-2000) and George W. Bush 
(years in service: 2001-2008). Our study period encompasses 16 years; out of which both 
the Republican (1990-1992 & 2001-2005) and the Democratic Party (1993-2000) held 
power at the White House for 8 years each. EPA’s air quality dataset at the facility level 
(called the AFS dataset) includes the number of inspections (yearly), enforcement actions 
(yearly, location (zipcode, county, state) and primary SIC code for the industries for each 
facility for the years 1990-2005. Number of yearly inspections at the facility level is our 
dependent variable. Since amount of past years’ toxic release by a facility is an important 
factor determining whether the facility would be inspected this year, we use the EPA’s 
TRI (Toxic Release Inventory) dataset to obtain toxic emissions (pounds/year) by each 
facility for the years 1989-2004. However, the facilities recorded in the AFS dataset do 
not fully correspond to the facilities recorded in the TRI dataset. In other words, there are 
a lot of facilities in the AFS dataset (TRI dataset) that have no mention in the TRI dataset 
(AFS  dataset).  Therefore,  we  restrict  our  attention  to  only  those  facilities  that  are 7
common to both AFS and TRI dataset. We also restrict our attention to facilities that are 
located in one of the 50 states of the US (for example, facilities located in Guam, Puerto 
Rico etc are not considered). There are a few puzzling issues about the AFS and TRI 
dataset, which we briefly discuss below.
(a) In the AFS dataset, a facility is mentioned only when it is inspected or some sort 
of enforcement action has been taken against it. For example, if a facility is inspected in 
the years 1990 & 1992 but not in 1991, then the facility gets recorded for the years 1990 
& 1992 and nothing is recorded about the facility for the year 1991.
(b) Conceivably, a facility might not be inspected in a year when it is operating. The 
number of inspections for the facility for that year is therefore, zero. However, a facility 
can be inspected in a  year when it is closed (or not operating), maybe due to safety 
reasons. In general, if a facility is closed in a year, it has a less chance of being inspected. 
(c) It is  imperative  to  know  the  operational  status  (whether open  or  closed)  of  a 
facility for a given year. However, the AFS dataset does not have such information. This 
creates a serious problem for the following reason. If a facility is recorded in the AFS 
dataset  for  the  first  time  in  the  year  1995,  it  is  not  known  whether  the  facility  was 
operating and was never inspected between the years 1990-1994 or the facility did exist 
prior to 1995. Similarly, if a facility is recorded in the AFS dataset for the last time in the 
year  2002,  it  is  not  clear  whether  the  facility  remained  operational  and  was  never 
inspected between the years 2003-2005 or it did not exist 2003 onwards. Thus, for any 
given facility, figuring out the start (and end) year of operation was not possible from the 
AFS dataset unless the facility is reported for inspection/enforcement action for each of 8
the years between 1990 and 2005. In addition to this, the AFS dataset did not have yearly 
operational status for the facilities. We used the TRI dataset to solve these two problems. 
(d) The  TRI  dataset  has  facility  level  information  on  yearly  toxic  releases  and 
operational status (yearly). Like in the AFS dataset, TRI dataset also has missing years 
for facilities. We merged the AFS and the TRI dataset using a unique facility identifier 
and year. To figure out the start and end year of operation for a facility, we used the 
following method. 
First year of operation = earlier of {(I) first year of appearance in the AFS dataset for 
inspection/enforcement  reason,  (II)  first  year  recorded  as  “operational”  in  the  TRI 
dataset}. The first year of operation was truncated from below at 1989. Similarly,
Last  year  of operation  = later of  {(I) last  year  of appearance in  the AFS dataset for 
inspection/enforcement  reason,  (II)  last  year  recorded  as  “operational”  in  the  TRI 
dataset}.  The  last  year of operation  was truncated  from  above  at 2005.  If nothing  is 
recorded against a facility for any in between year in the AFS dataset, the facility is 
recorded as having zero number of inspection in that year.
(e) Since toxic release in the last year is an important determinant of inspection or 
enforcement activity by EPA in the current year, the facility-year observations for which 
no data on toxic release was available in the TRI dataset will ultimately get dropped 
during the regression analysis.          
From  the  Bureau  of  Labor  Statistics,  we  have  annual  county-level  per  capita 
income, unemployment rates and population density. State-level demographic data on 
Sierra  Club  membership  is  obtained  from  the  Sierra  Club.  Zipcodes  are  used  to  tie 
facilities to U.S. Congressional districts (using information from the Missouri Census 9
Data Center). Zipcodes are also used to tie facilities to counties where they are located. 
Using the US Congressional Biography, we collect political data on U.S. Senators and 
Representatives (party affiliation and seniority) for each congressional district. Data on 
the 101
st to 109
th US congress is used for this purpose.
We consider a variety of different indicators of political influence. To test for 
impacts  of  common  party  affiliation  between  Congressional  representatives  and  the 
presidential Administration, we construct party-specific (Democrat (D)/Republican (R)) 
dummy variables for common affiliation of (i) the House Representative, (ii) any one of 
the U.S. Senators. We also consider corresponding common affiliation dummies for the 
party in power in Congress (with both parties considered in power when the chambers are 
split).  Two  party-specific  Congressional  seniority  measures  are  constructed.  For 
seniority,  we  use  the  number  of  years  a  Representative  (or  a  senator)  has  served  in 
Congress (or senate) continuously prior to a given year.  In addition, we construct an 
overall combined seniority measure for the two senators if both of them represent the 
Republican Party. 
Our  dependent  variable is number  of  inspection actions,  by  facility  by  year.  
Following  the  literature,  the  inspection  models  contain  the  following  right-hand 
variables: (I) Demographic, Environmental and Economic Variables: (one year) lagged 
toxic release, county level unemployment rate, county level population density; county 
level per-capita income, state level Sierra Club membership, state level Strict Liability 
Statute. (II) Political Variables: Party affiliation and seniority. (III) Dummy Variables:
State, year and Standard Industrial Code (SIC) dummies. Due to the “count” nature of the 10
dependent variable, we consider Poisson and Negative Binomial regression models for 
random effects. Table 1 and 2 respective define the variables and the summary statistics.
To summarize, the dependent variable of our model is Count_Insit and it stands 
for the number of inspections at facility i in year t. All our independent variables also 
have a facility and year suffix. In order to test the hypotheses stated in section 2, we try 
various specifications of the independent variables in the right hand side of the equations.     
4. Preliminary Results & Conclusion
Table 3 summarizes our first model. Other than the dummy variables for state, year
and  SIC  code,  we  use  lag_release,  sierraper,  sliab,  unemployment,  popdensity,  PCI, 
cong_dum  and  atleast_1senator_dum  as  independent  variables.  Results  from  random 
effects Poisson regression and random effects negative binomial regression are produced. 
This  table  corresponds  to  hypotheses  I,  III  and  IV.  Although  the  elasticities  of  the 
independent variables are different across these two regressions due to computational 
reason, the set of coefficients are fairly close to  each other with  the same sign. The 
coefficient  of  lag_release  is  positive  and  significant  under  both  the  models.  The 
lag_release is usually a large number, its coefficient is small. As usually understood, an
increase  in  toxic  release  by  a  facility  this  year  increases  the  possibility  of  it  being 
inspected next year. The coefficients of sierraper and sliab are significant and negative 
under both regressions indicate that there exist substitution effects for EPA’s monitoring 
activities.  In  other  words,  EPA  tends  to  inspect  a  facility  less  if  it  is  located  in  a 
environmentally  conscious  state. This  phenomenon  lends  support  to  hypothesis  III. 
Higher rate of unemployment at the county level reduces the possibility of a facility being 11
inspected due to further employment loss and this lends support to hypothesis IV. Under 
the Poisson model, a 1% increase in unemployment rate results in a 7.9% decrease in the 
number of inspections per  year. The coefficient of per capita income is negative and 
significant under both regressions. Other authors have also found a negative sign for per 
capita income in similar circumstances; however no proper explanation for such a sign 
has been provided. The coefficient of con_dum is negative and significant under both 
regressions  and  endorses  hypothesis  I.  in  other  words,  compared  to  a  democratic 
congressman;  the  presence  of  a  republican  congressman  reduces  the  possibility  of  a 
facility being inspected. In addition to this, the presence of at least one republican senator 
reduces the possibility of inspection compared to the situation when both senators are 
democratic. These  two results indicate that  the Republican Party and the  Democratic 
Party approach environmental issues differently.        
Table  4  summarizes  the  results  from  the  second  model  and  it  corresponds  to 
hypothesis  II.  In addition  to  the variables in  table  3, we use ‘senior_cong_dum’ and 
‘comb_seniority_atleast_1sen’ as  two  additional  variables.  These  two  variables  are 
supposed to capture any effect that seniority might have on inspection. As described in 
table  1,  ‘senior_cong_dum’ is  an  interaction  variable  between  the  republican 
congressman  dummy  and  congressman  seniority.  On  the  other  hand, the  variable 
‘comb_seniority_atleast_1sen’  is  an  interaction  between  the  at  least  one  republican 
senator dummy and their combined seniority. Note that independent variables that are 
common to  both  table  3 and table  4 have  the  same sign  attached to  their  respective 
coefficients across these tables. By and large, these coefficients are robust to alternative 
specifications. Under the Poisson model, the variable ‘senior_cong_dum’ has a negative 12
coefficient which is significant at 10% level of significance. This is a weak support for 
the hypothesis that congressional seniority matters for inspection activity. However, for 
the negative binomial model, the coefficient is not significant. The coefficient and the 
elasticity  of  the  variable  ‘comb_seniority_atleast_1sen’  are  significant  under  both 
Poisson and negative binomial regression. Under the Poisson regression, it indicates that 
compared to the situation where both senators from a state is democratic, a 1% rise in the 
combined seniority of the republican senators where at least one senator is republican 
reduces the number of inspections by 2.1%. This  is strong statistical evidence which 
indicates  that  senior  senators  on  an  average  are  more  influential  in  EPA’s  decision 
making than their junior counterparts.
    Table 5 represents the results from another equation where we introduce two new 
interaction variables ‘unemp_cong_dum’ and ‘unemp_atleast_1senator_dum’ to capture 
if senators and congressmen sensitive to the prevailing employment situation. The first 
variable amongst these two is the interaction between county unemployment rate and 
republican congressman dummy. The second variable is the interaction between county 
unemployment  rate  and  at  least  one  republican  senator  dummy.  Under  the  Poisson 
regression  the  coefficient  of  ‘unemp_cong_dum’  is  positive  (=  0.07)  and  significant 
indicating  that  compared  to  a  democratic  congressman,  the  presence  of  a  republican 
congressman results in more inspections at places where unemployment rate is higher. In 
other words, a typical republican congressman does not get influenced by the prevailing 
unemployment situation. On the other hand, compared to both senators being democratic, 
the presence of at least one republican senator reduces the number of inspections in high 
unemployment areas. This is suggestive that there are opposing influences on EPA even 13
from within the same party. However, the coefficients of these two variables are not 
significant under the negative binomial regression indicating weak support (only from 
Poisson regression) for the opposing influences.       
We try to capture the impact of political process at the federal level on politics the 
state level in terms of the next equation. In this equation we introduce two new variables 
‘bush_cong’  and ‘bush_atleast_1senator_dum’.  The  variable  ‘bush_cong’  is  an 
interaction between the dummy for the Republican Party at the White House and the 
dummy  for  a  republican  congressman.  Likewise,  ‘bush_atleast_1senator_dum’  is  an 
interaction between the dummy for the Republican Party at the White House and the 
dummy for at least one senator being republican. These two variables are intended to 
capture whether influence of the congressman and the senators on EPA are more if their 
own party occupies power at the federal level. The coefficient of ‘bush_cong’ is significant 
and positive under both Poisson and negative binomial regression. This implies that compared to 
a  democratic congressman,  the  presence  of  republican  congressman  increases  the  number  of 
inspections when republic administration holds power at the White House. However, we do not 
find any evidence for similar event when at least one of the senators from the state is republican.   
To summarize, we find preliminary evidence that political processes at the local, state and 
federal  level  do  impact  EPA’s  monitoring  activities.  Our  regression  results  show  that  (I) 
Compared  to  a  democratic  congressman,  presence  of  a  republican  congressman  reduces  the 
number of inspections at facilities that are located in his/her congressional district. (II) Maybe due 
to similar reasons, presence of at least one republican senator reduces the number of inspections 
at facilities in the same state compared to the situation when both senators from the same state are 
democratic. (III) Influence on EPA exerted by congressman and senators increases with their 
seniority. (IV) Unemployment pressure in an area leads EPA to inspect less at facilities located in 14
the same area. (V) Republican congressman influences EPA to inspect more when his/her party 
holds power at the White house compared to the Democratic Party holding power. 15
Table 1: Description of Variables
Variable Name  Variable Definition 
Count_Ins Number of Inspection Counts for a facility (yearly) 
Lag_Release Yearly release estimate (in pounds) reported by facility (Lagged by 1 year)
Sierraper Sierra club per-capita membership in firm/facility’s home state (annual)
Sliab Binary = 1 if  state has a strict liability statute
Unemployment Annual unemployment rate in county where firm/facility is located 
Popdensity Population density in county where firm/facility is located (yearly)
PCI Per capita yearly income in county where firm/facility is located (at 2000 
US$)
(1) Cong_Dum Binary = 1 if congressman from the area where facility is located is 
Republican (yearly)  
(2) Atleast_1Senator_Dum Binary = 1 if at least one of the senators from the state where facility is 
located is Republican (yearly) 
(3) Bush_Dum  Binary = 1 if Republican party is in power at the White House (yearly)
(4) Bush_Cong (1) multiplied by (3) 
(5) Bush_Atleast_1Senator_Dum (2) multiplied by (3)
(6) Cong_Seniority Seniority of congressman (years) from area where facility is located 
(yearly)
(7) Senior_Cong_Dum (1) multiplied by (6)
(8) Comb_Seniority Sum of the seniority of the Republican senator(s) from the state where 
facility is located (yearly)
(9) Comb_Seniority_Atleast_1Sen
(10) Unemp_Cong_Dum
(2) multiplied by (8)
Unemployment multiplied by (1)
(11) Unemp_Atleast_1Senator_Dum Unemployment multiplied by (2)16
Table 2: Summary Statistics
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Count_Ins 0.97 2.26 0 154
Lag_Release 309701.60 3417277 0 487000000
Sierraper 0 0 0.0003 0.0525
Sliab 0.78 0.41 0 1
Unemployment 5.48 1.98 0.90 25.80
Popdensity 892.92 1844.20 0.04 57366.96
PCI 25935.50 6145.92 4530.24 85826
Cong_Seniority 10.36 8.45 0 53
Comb_Seniority 10.58 11.63 0 5417
Table 3: Estimation Results for the Political Effects on Inspection
Dependent Var: # of Inspections/Year





Coeff Elasticity Coeff Elasticity
(Z stat) (Z stat) (Z stat) (Z stat)
lag_release 5.48E-09 0.0042 3.99E-09 0.0007
(7.05)** (7.04)** (5.15)** (4.93)**
Sierraper -13.559 -0.0413 -12.509 -0.0082
(5.00)** (-4.99)** (4.40)** (4.40)**
Sliab -0.107 -0.1475 -0.065 -0.0192
(6.54)** (-6.53)** (3.77)** (3.77)**
Unemployment -0.008 -0.0792 -0.007 -0.0151
(3.52)** (-3.52)** (3.00)** (3.00)**
Popdensity -2.22E-06 -0.0031 -1.06E-06 -0.0003
-0.84 -0.84 -0.40 -0.40
PCI -5.26E-06 -0.2342 -6.20E-06 -0.0591
(5.39)** (-5.39)** (6.28)** (6.27)**
cong_dum -0.031 -0.0290 -0.012 -0.0024
(4.35)** (-4.34)** 1.64 1.64
atleast_1senator_dum -0.178 -0.2250 -0.157 -0.0424




Number of Facilities 16228
For the “Coeff” Column, absolute value 
of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%18
Table 4: Estimation Results for the Effects of Seniority on Inspection
Dependent Var: # of Inspections/Year
Random Effects 
Poisson Regression
Random Effects Negative 
Binomial Regression
Coeff Elasticity Coeff Elasticity
(Z stat) (Z stat) (Z stat) (Z stat)
lag_release 5.48E-09 0.004 4.00E-09 0.0007
(7.06)** (7.05)** (5.16)** (5.16)**
sierraper -13.55 -0.041 -12.486 -0.0081
(4.99)** (4.98)** (4.39)** (-4.39)**
sliab -0.103 -0.142 -0.061 -0.0181
(6.27)** (6.26)** (3.54)** (-3.54)**
Unemployment -0.009 -0.083 -0.008 -0.0158
(3.65)** (3.65)** (3.13)** (-3.13)**
Population Density -2.22E-06 -0.003 -1.02E-06 -0.0003
-0.84 -0.84 -0.38 -0.38
PCI -5.18E-06 -0.231 -6.13E-06 -0.0585
(5.30)** (5.3)** (6.20)** (-6.2)**
cong_dum -0.022 -0.021 -0.004 -0.0007
(2.58)** (2.58)** -0.41 -0.41
senior_cong_dum -0.001 -0.009 -0.001 -0.0017
-1.85 -1.85 -1.58 -1.58
atleast_1senator_dum -0.173 -0.219 -0.152 -0.0412
(17.46)** (17.25)** (14.45)** (-14.38)**
comb_seniority_atleast_1sen -0.001 -0.021 -0.001 -0.0041




Number of Facility 16228
For the “Coeff” column, absolute value of 
z statistics in parentheses parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%19
Table 5: Estimation Results for the Interactive Effects of Economy and Politics on Inspection






Coeff Elasticity Coeff Elasticity
lag_release 5.48E-09 0.004 3.99E-09 0.0007
(7.05)** (7.03)** (5.15)** (5.15)**
Sierraper -13.77 -0.042 -12.644 -0.0083
(5.07)** (-5.06)** (4.45)** (-4.44)**
Sliab -0.112 -0.155 -0.068 -0.0201
(6.82)** (-6.81)** (3.92)** (-3.92)**
Unemployment -0.005 -0.051 -0.005 -0.0101
-1.49 -1.49 -1.31 -1.31
Population Density -2.26E-06 -0.003 -1.16E-06 -0.0003
-0.85 -0.85 -0.43 -0.43
PCI -5.23E-06 -0.233 -6.19E-06 -0.0590
(5.37)** (-5.36)** (6.27)** (-6.27)**
cong_dum -0.069 -0.06 -0.027 -0.0054
(3.72)** (-3.71)** -1.4 -1.40
unemp_cong_dum 0.007 0.033 0.003 0.0028
(2.20)* (2.2)* -0.84 0.84
atleast_1senator_dum -0.128 -0.162 -0.126 -0.0342
(5.73)** (-5.73)** (5.36)** (-5.35)**
unemp_atleast_1senator_dum -0.009 -0.059 -0.005 -0.0076




Number of Facility 16228 16228
For the “Coeff” column, absolute value 
of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%20
Table 6: Estimation Results for the Interactive Effects of Federal and State Politics on Inspection
Dependent Var: # of Inspections/Year
Random Effects Poisson 
Regression
Random Effects Negative Binomial 
Regression
Coeff Elasticity Coeff Elasticity
lag_release 5.47E-09 0.004 3.98E-09 0.001
(7.04)** (7.02)** (5.14)** (5.14)**
sierraper -13.565 -0.041 -12.556 -0.008
(5.01)** (-5.01)** (4.43)** (-4.43)**
sliab -0.108 -0.149 -0.066 -0.019
(6.63)** (-6.62)** (3.82)** (-3.82)**
Unemployment -0.008 -0.079 -0.007 -0.015
(3.51)** (-3.51)** (3.03)** (-3.03)**
Population Density -2.18E-06 -0.003 -1.02E-06 0.000
-0.82 -0.82 -0.38 -0.38
PCI -5.12E-06 -0.228 -6.12E-06 -0.058
(5.25)** (-5.25)** (6.20)** (-6.19)**
cong_dum -0.059 -0.055 -0.031 -0.006
(6.51)** (-6.5)** (3.22)** (-3.22)**
bush_cong 0.053 0.025 0.035 0.004
(4.97)** (4.97)** (3.07)** (3.07)**
atleast_1senator_dum -0.191 -0.242 -0.172 -0.047
(15.13)** (-15)** (12.74)** (-12.68)**
bush_atleast_1senator_dum 0.021 0.013 0.024 0.003




Number of Facility 16228 16228
For the "Coeff" column, absolute value 
of z statistics in parentheses
* significant at 5%; ** significant at 1%21
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